Comparing Medical Provider Performance: A First Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics by Cohen, Neil B. & Twerski, Aaron D.
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1992
"Comparing Medical Provider Performance: A First
Look at the New Era of Medical Statistics"
Neil B. Cohen
Brooklyn Law School, neil.cohen@brooklaw.edu
Aaron D. Twerski
Brooklyn Law School, aaron.twerski@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Courts Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, Other Law Commons, and the
Privacy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
58 Brook. L. Rev. 5 (1992-1993)
ARTICLES
COMPARING MEDICAL PROVIDERS: A FIRST
LOOK AT THE NEW ERA OF MEDICAL
STATISTICS
Aaron D. Twerski* and Neil B. Cohen**
INTRODUCTION
The right of a patient to informed choice is relatively new.
Thirty years ago, the major tort law treatises made no mention
of it whatsoever.1 Much has transpired during the past three de-
cades. Courts have widely recognized an affirmative obligation
on the part of medical care providers to share information with
patients regarding the risks accompanying recommended medi-
cal procedures and the availability of different alternative proce-
dures.' As medical information has become more sophisticated,
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. A.B. 1960, Beth Medrash Elyon Research
Institute; J.D. 1965, Marquette University;, B.S. 1970, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. S.B. 1974, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; J.D. 1977, New York University.
The authors are grateful to Professor James Henderson, Jr., of Cornell Law School,
for his valuable critique of this manuscript.
1 The leading torts hornbook, Wu.iM L PROSSER. THE LAW OF TomRs (2d ed. 1955)
made no reference whatsoever to a cause of action for informed consent. Other writers at
the time expressed no sentiment in favor of such a cause of action. See, e.g., Harry
Kalven Jr., A Special Corner of Civil Liberties: A Legal View 1, 31 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1223,
1224 (1956); Morris Ploscowe, The Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems: A Legal
View 1I, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1240 (1956).
' The earliest case recognizing informed consent was Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). The literature deal-
ing with the informed consent doctrine is staggering in volume. A good review of the
contours of the law can be found in PAUL S. APPELBA m LT AL, INFOnsIE- CoNsm-r chs. 3,
6 (1987); W. PAGE KEaTN aT LA., PaOSSER AND KEn ON ON THE LAw OF TomRs § 32, at
189-92 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PaOSSER & KEaTN]; Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A
Fairy Tale: Law's Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 137 (1977); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From
Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE LJ. 219, 239-29
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the data available to medical providers have become more exact
and refined.3 The duty to provide information may require more
than a simple sharing of visceral concerns about the wisdom of
undertaking a given therapeutic procedure. Physicians may have
a responsibility to identify and correlate risk factors and to com-
municate the results to patients as a predicate to fulfilling their
obligation to inform.
Running parallel to the development of more sophisticated
data concerning risks of various therapeutic procedures has been
the development of statistical models that compare the success
rates of medical providers, such as hospitals and doctors, in per-
forming various procedures.4 The theoretical basis for drawing
such comparisons is quite elementary. Just as one controls for
various other risk factors in assessing the likelihood of success of
a given therapeutic intervention, so one should be able to iden-
tify whether a hospital or a physician adds to or detracts from
that likelihood. The major stumbling block standing in the way
of comparing medical providers is the wide variation in the
mixes of patients whom they service. It is fully understandable,
for example, that more seriously ill patients will demonstrate
poorer outcomes than will patients with healthier profiles and
that some providers treat a higher percentage of such patients
than do others. A good statistical model must account for all im-
portant variables and must be based on sufficient clinical experi-
ence to be meaningful.
In 1990 the New York State Department of Health pub-
lished a study dealing with adult open heart surgery at various
hospitals in the state of New York.5 The study was notable in
(1985); Eleanor S. Glass, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy For the Doc-
tor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). For a succinct analysis of the law,
providing a state-by-state compilation of the differing rules, see 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP app. L at 193, 206-45
(1982) [hereinafter MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS].
s See infra notes 5-8.
Id. See also Harris Meyer, Informed Consent Key in Emerging Suits, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 27, 1992 ("An example is proposed legislation moving through Congress that
would require fertility treatment centers to disclose their individual in vitro success
rates.").
I Edward L. Hannan et al., Adult Open Heart Surgery in New York State, An
Analysis of Risk Factors and Hospital Mortality Rates, 254 JAMA 2768 (1990).
[Vol. 58:56
COMPARING MEDICAL PROVIDERS
that it controlled for twenty different surgical risk factors that
might affect the outcome of the surgery. The results revealed
substantial differences in success rates among the hospitals stud-
ied. The performance of several hospitals gave cause for concern
because their mortality rates on a risk-adjusted basis exceeded
what could be attributed to normal statistical variation.0 A simi-
lar statistical analysis was undertaken of surgeons performing
open-heart surgery.7 Once again, statistically significant varia-
tion of considerable magnitude was evident. Although the
ground-breaking study was limited to open-heart surgery, simi-
lar studies have been or will be undertaken for a variety of other
frequently performed surgical procedures. 8
In the foreseeable future we should see a sharp increase in
both the number and the sophistication of such comparative sta-
tistical studies. The most strident critics of such studies do not
quarrel with the basic concepts. Rather, they argue that the
studies are too crude and insufficiently developed to allow for
meaningful conclusions.9 Yet greater sophistication in the statis-
tical modeling is only a matter of time. Now or in the near fu-
ture both the medical and legal communities will have to ad-
dress whether, and to what extent, these statistical studies may
be utilized in their respective disciplines. Physicians and hospi-
tals may wish to use these studies for peer review; insurers may
wish to utilize them for rate-setting purposes; and attorneys may
wish to use them in medical malpractice actions, including both
traditional negligence and informed consent claims.
An exploration of all of the issues arising from comparative
medical statistics would require the input of multiple disci-
plines. The goal of this Note is more modest. We intend to iden-
tify the problems that will be encountered if attorneys seek to
use this new genre of statistical data in two strands of tradi-
8 Id. Table 5 at 2772.
7These statistics were published in Newsday. See David Zinman, Heart Surgeons
Rated; State Reveals Patient Mortality Records, NEWSDAY, December 18, 1991, at 3.
a See, e.g., Michael S. Zdeb & Vito M. Legrillo, Cesarean Childbirth in New York
State: Trends and Directions, BIRTH, Dec. 1989, at 203; NEw YoRK STATE Dm R'Mr~m.r
OF HEALTH, BuREAu OF BIOSTATISTICS, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH IN NEW YoRK STATE (Nov.
1987). The authors are informed that statistical studies similar to those already done for
adult open-heart surgery are being planned for some neurological and urological surgical
procedures.
1 See Jesse Green, Problems in the Use of Outcome Statistics to Compare Health
Care Providers, 58 BROOK L. REv. 55 (1992).
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tional medical malpractice litigation-negligence and the failure
to obtain informed consent.
I. THE NEW INFORMATION ERA
A. Risk Information Highly Correlated to Patient Risk
Factors
Until recently, physicians dealt with risk information in a
highly subjective fashion. For example, an obese patient with a
history of diabetes was considered to be at greater risk for coro-
nary bypass surgery than a patient without these conditions. In
assessing the risks of surgery as against continued use of medici-
nal therapy, a physician would make an impressionistic judg-
ment about the wisdom of surgical intervention and relay that
judgment and the reasoning underlying it to the patient. It is
doubtful that such imprecise decision making will suffice much
longer.10 Today it is possible to determine risk factors that take
into account not only general information about outcomes from
the procedure, but also much information about the patient.1
Thus, physicians will have at their fingertips statistical data to
inform them of the risks associated with a given surgical proce-
dure for patients with a given profile.
Of course, to make an appropriate treatment decision, a
provider must evaluate how a patient would fare with alterna-
tive medical interventions. When the provider has statistical risk
10 The many risk factors identified and controlled for in the New York State study
show the greater precision with which risk analysis may now be done. See supra note 7
and accompanying text. The study factors included: age; race; gender; payer; preopera-
tion (a cardiac or great-vessel procedure performed during any previous admission); ejec-
tion traction; previous myocardial infarction; morbid obesity (1.5 times ideal weight);
hypertension history (requiring therapy); preoperative intra-aortic balloon pump; dialy-
sis dependency; disasters (acute structural defect, renal failure, cariogenic shock, gun-
shot); intractable congestive heart failure (CHF), New York Heart Association functional
class IV, symptoms of CHF at rest; diabetes requiring medication; <90 degrees narrow-
ing of left main trunk; percutaneous transluminal coronary anoplasty "crash"; cardiac
catheterization "crash"; unstable angina; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease resulting
in functional disability hospitalization or forced expiratory volume in 1 second <75 de-
grees of predicted or requiring bronchoduator therapy; and type of operation (coronary
artery bypass graft, valve, coronary artery bypass graft plus valve, other).
1 Dr. Gerald T. O'Connor, Chairman of Medical Research, Department of
Medicine, Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, address at the Brooklyn Law School
Symposium: Comparing Medical Providers, January 9, 1992, related that surgeons at the
medical center are already armed with pocket computers which allow them to assess
multiple risks depending on a given patient profile (on file with Brooklyn Law Review).
(Vol. 58:56
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information as to one form of medical intervention, but no such
information as to alternative treatments, a simple comparison of
risks is impossible. Thus, in such cases, which are likely to be
the norm for quite some time, medical decision making will not
consist solely of evaluating statistical data. Moreover, non-quan-
tifiable "human elements" will always be part of the mix.
Even with these limitations,, however, the medical profes-
sion will be unable to escape using available statistical informa-
tion. At the very least, providers who do not consider such infor-
mation in their decision making will be required to explain why.
In addition, it is likely that providers, as part of their duty to
provide informed choice, will be called upon to share risk infor-
mation with patients.
Notwithstanding the rather common sense quality of these
observations, one must be cautious in concluding that the failure
to use and communicate such risk data will be determinative in
medical malpractice cases. Where the plaintiff alleges that the
doctor was negligent for choosing a given surgical procedure in
light of the patient's risk profile, it is likely that a physician will
have considered many of the factors in her own impressionistic
judgment to recommend the procedure. If the doctor's rationale
was sufficient to overcome her own ex ante internal evaluation
of the risk factors, it is likely to be equally convincing in the
context of ex post external review at trial in which the statistical
information is considered. Admittedly, the statistical informa-
tion has a focused quality and may be somewhat difficult to
overcome. Nonetheless, unless the doctor's impressionistic evalu-
ation is substantially off the mark, it is unlikely that the statisti-
cal data, even though more precise, will convince a jury that the
doctor's risk valuation was negligent.2
However, in informed consent cases, the failure of providers
to develop and communicate relevant statistical information to
patients may take on greater significance. An injured plaintiff
who suffers an undesired result from a surgical intervention can
be expected to argue that, if he or she had been told the
probability of an adverse outcome given the particular patient's
profile, the plaintiff would have refused the surgery. Formidable
22 The analysis, however, is dramatically different when the statistical information
concerns risks associated with the particular provider. See infra notes 38-49 and accom-
panying text.
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barriers, however, stand in the way of this argument. Even when
a doctor fails entirely to inform a patient of risks attendant to a
surgical or other invasive procedure, a plaintiff faces a difficult
causation problem.13 As long as the doctor's advice is sound and
non-negligent, it will be difficult to convince a jury that the pa-
tient would have discounted the doctor's recommendation and
declined to undergo treatment.14 After all, most reasonable pa-
tients follow the advice of their reasonable doctors. 15 Further-
more, since the doctor will have, in this case, shared with the
patient her impressionistic assessment of the risks, the argument
would have to be that the provider's failure to provide the statis-
tical information to the patient caused the patient to acquiesce
to the medical procedure.16
In short, causation problems are likely to loom very large in
attempts to establish that a provider's failure to utilize statisti-
cal information concerning patient-specific risks "caused" a pa-
tient to submit to medical intervention. In a different forum the
authors have asserted that the causation argument seriously un-
dermines the goal of patient autonomy.' We have also argued
that it is extremely difficult to determine after the fact how any
individual patient's decision making would have played out.' 8
1 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12 (Cal. 1972); Reikes v. Martin, 471
So.2d 385, 392-93 (Miss. 1985); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558-59 (Okla. 1979).
1 We do not mean to imply that the causation test gives a doctor any sense of
assurance that a case of informed consent cannot be successfully established. For the
most part causation is a fact-sensitive question that almost always goes to the jury.
Nonetheless, the causation hurdle is a difficult one for plaintiffs to overcome.
"I See Leonard L. Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.
REv. 580, 589-90; Schultz, supra note 2, at 249-50.
1I It is only the failure to communicate the additionally desired information that is
tortious. If the plaintiff would have made the same decision with or without the addi-
tional information, then causation has not been established. See supra note 11. Once
again the analysis is dramatically different if the statistical information concerns risks
associated with the particular provider. See infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
17 See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision-Making and the Law
of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV., 607, 614-15. See also
Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 87, 121 n.72 (1976); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Laswell: Some Reflections on
Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L. J.
683, 691 (1975); Jay Katz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 79-80 (1984);
Koopersmith, Informed Consent: The Problem of Causation, 3 MED. & LAw 231, 233-36
(1984); David E. Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice and
Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 621,
623-24 (1986).
18 See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 17, at 626-48.
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These arguments notwithstanding, causation continues to play a
significant role in medical malpractice cases and would likely
make it difficult for a plaintiff to prevail before a jury on the
sole ground that statistical information was not adequately con-
sidered. However, when one uses such statistical information to
supplement an otherwise plausible malpractice or informed con-
sent case, its role changes considerably. Statistics may provide
graphic and highly focused information that is very convincing
to a jury. If, in explaining a surgical procedure to a patient, a
given risk was understated by a doctor, the plaintiff's claim that
the risk should have been given more prominence would be
much enhanced by pointing to the statistical frequency of the
ultimate harm suffered. Contrasting a soft warning against the
starkness of hard statistics may serve to bolster the plaintiff's
argument that the physician failed to communicate adequate
information.
In conclusion, the increasing availability of patient-specific
statistical information does not raise-as does provider-specific
information-new ideological issues in negligent malpractice or
informed consent causes of action. Nevertheless, advocates are
expected to make use of the statistical data, or the failure to
develop such data, to strengthen their positions in litigation.
B. Provider-Specific Information
The 1990 New York State Department of Health study
broke new ground. 9 It was the first study to use detailed clinical
information from an entire state to identify significant risk fac-
tors, including the identity of the physician and hospital, with
respect to a specific surgical procedure. As a result, patients are
able to evaluate a medical health provider as an independent
risk factor for the first time.
This new source of provider-specific information has poten-
tial relevance for actions alleging medical negligence and lack of
informed consent. If such statistical information signals that a
particular physician or hospital experiences bad results compar-
atively frequently when undertaking a given procedure, the con-
duct of the provider in deciding to perform the procedure may
" See supra note 5.
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be negligent in the first instance. 20 However, the very nature of
this information makes the analysis much more difficult than in
a typical negligence case.2
An even more intriguing question concerns the role of pro-
vider-specific data in an action predicated on informed consent.
Patients who suffer adverse results from a procedure may well
argue that the medical provider had an obligation to disclose her
success rates for that procedure to enable the patient to decide
20 Moreover, the physician may face disciplinary action and administrative sanctions
as well. Pursuant to N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 230(1) (McKinney Supp. 1992), the New
York State Department of Health is authorized to institute disciplinary proceedings
against physicians for instances of professional misconduct, as defined by N.Y. EDUC.
LAW § 6530 (McKinney Supp. 1992). Professional misconduct is defined as either
"[p]racticing the profession with negligence on more than one occasion" N.Y. EDUc. LAW.
§ 6530(3) (McKinney Supp. 1992) or ". . . accepting and performing professional respon-
sibilities which the [physician] knows or has reason to know that he or she is not compe-
tent to perform." Id. § 6530(24).
Several crucial issues arise with respect to these definitions of professional miscon-
duct and the proliferation of medical provider statistics. First, how substantial a differ-
ence must there be between a negligent provider and a reasonable provider for liability
to attach in an administrative proceeding? This is crucial because once the Department
of Health determines what level of risk is acceptable for a given procedure, plaintiffs who
sue physicians for negligently undertaking a procedure will come into court armed with
the Department of Health's administrative rulings.
That, in turn, leads to the second question: is an administrative ruling sanctioning a
physician determinative of the negligence issue in a suit for damages? That is, will the
administrative ruling establish negligence as a matter of law, create a rebuttable pre-
sumption of negligence for the jury to accept or reject, or will it be considered simply
evidence of the physician's negligence?
Whether the administrative sanction resulted from the physician's treating the
plaintiff whose injury was the subject of the administrative inquiry; or whether the phy-
sician was sanctioned for performing a procedure on someone other than the plaintiff, a
finding that a physician's performance statistics are unacceptable to the state Depart-
ment of Health is likely to be of considerable importance in the ensuing negligence litiga-
tion. An administrative determination setting the standard of acceptable performance
based on prior performance statistics is not fact-sensitive to the particular provider and
thus arguably becomes the standard of care for the tort case. Thus, there may be no need
to reitigate the negligence issue. Of course, the physician may wish to introduce evi-
dence that in this procedure, her conduct was reasonable. See infra note 38.
Finally, what effect on subsequent administrative proceedings should a negligence
verdict have against a physician? A jury could conclude that performance at a given risk
level constitutes negligence where an administrative agency might opt for a higher
threshold before sanctioning a physician. The goals of the common law tort system and
regulatory adjudication need not be identical. The purpose of the administrative body is
to protect citizens who come in contact with state licensed practitioners, while the civil
justice system exists to provide remedies for actionable wrongs. See In re DiMarcsico v.
Ambach, 48 N.Y. 576, 399 N.E.2d 1129, 424 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1979); In re Morfesis v. Sobol,
172 A.D.2d 897, 567 N.Y.S.2d 954 (3d Dep't 1991).
21 See infra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
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whether to utilize that provider or an available alternate. Will
the law recognize such a duty on the part of an individual pro-
vider? Need the provider offer data comparing her success rates
with those of other providers? Can a plaintiff successfully estab-
lish that his injury was causally related to the failure of the pro-
vider to supply the desired information? The existing law of in-
formed consent provides only limited guidance for an action
based on the failure of a provider to tell a patient about pro-
vider-specific risk information. Moreover, this issue has not been
addressed by the literature.
Therefore, this Note can do little more than explore the dif-
ficulties in establishing an independent cause of action based on
provider-specific risk data. Notwithstanding these difficulties, we
are quite certain, as the statistical validity of such data becomes
firmly established, they will become an integral part of medical
malpractice litigation. Whether standing alone or in combination
with other more traditional types of proof, these statistical data
will exert a powerful influence.
1. Negligence: Is It Actionable For A "Risky" Provider to
Perform A Given Procedure?
To utilize now available provider-specific risk information
most effectively, it is necessary first to create an "adjusted risk
factor" for each provider. The creation of an "adjusted risk fac-
tor" for each provider, controlling for all known variables other
than the identity of the provider, enables provider-specific infor-
mation to be used in the most effective manner. The adjusted
risk factor for each provider can then be compared with the ad-
justed risk factor of each other provider to reveal quickly the
relative risk of utilizing one provider or the other for the specific
procedure.
If a provider's adjusted risk factor is relatively high com-
pared to those of other providers, can that, itself, ever be the
basis for a malpractice claim in negligence? This question does
not focus on the evidentiary relevance of the adjusted risk factor
to determine whether a procedure was negligently performed. 22
Rather, the issue is whether the fact that a provider's adjusted
22 See Paul D. Rheingold, The Admissibility of Evidence in Malpractice Cases: The
Performance Record of Practitioners, 58 BROOK. L REv. 75 (1992).
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risk factor for a particular procedure is poor can provide the ba-
sis for a negligence claim in the absence of proof that the proce-
dure itself was poorly performed.
Our answer to this question is a qualified yes. The theory is
that, in certain cases, a provider's decision to perform a proce-
dure at which she is substantially worse than the relevant "mar-
ket" is, itself, negligence apart from the question of whether the
procedure was performed competently. 3 After all, the provider,
by choosing to perform the procedure, has chosen to expose the
patient to an unnecessarily high level of risk. If the performance
of the procedure results in harm to the patient, the provider's
decision to perform the procedure is a "but-for" cause of the
harm. 4 Therefore, the provider, in proper circumstances, should
be liable for the consequences of her improper decision.
To move from this initial generalization to a usable rule,
several difficult pieces of analysis must be undertaken. First, it
must be determined how "bad" a provider's risk factor must be
for a decision to perform the procedure to be deemed negligent.
2 At first blush one might consider analogizing this situation to breach of licensing
statutes. Most courts refuse to treat the failure to attain a license as relevant to the
question of situational negligence. See Charles Gregory, Breach of Criminal Licensing
Statutes in Civil Litigation, 36 CORNELL L. REV. 622 (1951). Presumably unlicensed per-
sonnel are less competent than those who possess a license. However, the analogy does
not carry. The failure to obtain a license does not bear directly on an actor's competence.
Many reasons, other than lack of competence, can be given for the failure to obtain a
license. The case to be made out by provider-specific statistics goes directly to the com-
petence of a provider to undertake a particular surgical procedure.
It is interesting that a leading case holding that breach of a licensing statute was
inadmissible in a negligence action, Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926),
was overturned by a statute which provides that when one "not authorized to provide
medicine . . . [was] a producing proximate or contributing cause of • . . injuries or
death, the fact that such person practiced medicine without being so authorized shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of negligence." N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 4504 (McKinney
1992).
Although under this statute an unlicensed practitioner could defend herself by dem-
onstrating that her conduct was, in fact, non-negligent, under our proposal a compara-
tively risky provider whose decision to perform a medical procedure was negligent could
defend herself only by showing that her conduct was non-causal, i.e., that the identical
injury would have occurred even if an alternate provider had performed the procedure.
As a practical matter, however, in the case of an unlicensed practitioner, the only
realistic method for the unlicensed actor to defend herself would be to convince the
finder of fact that the same injury would have occurred if the procedure were performed
by a licensed and fully competent practitioner.
" Of course, the harm might have occurred even if a "less risky" provider had per-
formed the procedure. This, too, must be taken into account. See infra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text.
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A "reasonable provider" test should be used here.25 A decision to
perform a prbcedure despite one's high risk factor is, itself, neg-
ligent when a reasonable provider, knowing that risk factor and
the distribution of risk factors of other providers, would not per-
form the procedure.
For a reasonable provider to decide not to perform the pro-
cedure, two elements must be present. First, the difference be-
tween the provider's risk factor and that of an alternative pro-
vider must be significant. That is, it must be sufficiently likely
that the difference between the risk factors reflects a true differ-
ence in probable outcomes and not merely an illusion resulting
from random factors in the data. Second, the difference in the
211 One who holds himself out as a specialist is required to meet the standard of care
of a reasonable specialist. See PRossER & K zTON, supra note 2, § 32 at 191.
26 Whenever one seeks to draw inferences from sample information, there is a risk
that what appears to be a difference between two actors may reflect nothing more than
differences which could be expected from repeated samplings from the same actor. For
example, if Coin A and Coin B were each flipped 10 times and heads turned up six times
for Coin A and four times for Coin B, the data could be read to suggest that Coin A
comes up heads 60% of the time, while Coin B comes up heads only 40% of the time.
Should one conclude that Coin A is a more "pro-heads" coin than Coin B? Of course not.
The difference between six heads out of ten and four heads out of ten could easily result
from chance. If, however, each coin were flipped 10,000 times, with Coin A coming up
heads 6,000 times and Coin B coming up heads 4,000 times, the analysis would be quite
different. Once again, the data suggest that Coin A is a 60% heads coin and Coin B a
40% heads coin. This time, however, one would likely conclude that Coin A is more "pro-
heads" than Coin B. Why? Because the difference between 6,000 heads out of 10,000
flips and 4,000 heads out of 10,000 flips is quite unlikely to occur by chance if the coins
are identical.
Since we can never "know" whether an observed difference is real or merely a ran-
dom occurrence, any standard of significance that we choose to apply for deciding
whether a difference is significant will result in errors in some cases. If the standard is
high, i.e., if we demand very stark differences before rejecting the hypothesis that they
result merely from chance variations, we will have very few cases in which we incorrectly
state that a given providers risk factor is higher than that of an alternate provider. On
the other hand, there will likely be quite a few cases in which the provider in question
truly is riskier, but where the difference is not stark enough to meet the standard; and,
therefore, we do not conclude that the provider is riskier than the alternate provider. If
the standard of significance is relatively low, however, there will be fewer cases in which
we incorrectly fail to conclude that a real difference exists, but more cases where we
conclude that there is a real difference when, in fact, there is none.
How to balance the risks of these two types of errors is the key decision in determin-
ing a significance test. The choice of the appropriate significance test has long intrigued
courts and commentators. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, 911 F.2d 941 (3d
Cir. 1990); -Constantine Kokkoris, Comment, DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.: Statistical Significance and the Novel Scientific Technique, 58 BROOm L. Ry. 219
(1992). See generally Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabili-
ties: A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CoRm=. L. REv. 78 (1987); Neil B. Cohen, Confi-
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risk factors must be substantial. The difference must be large
enough to justify a determination that, even after taking into
account the dislocation and additional expense and effort in-
volved for the patient in identifying and arranging with an alter-
nate "provider," the extra benefit to the patient of utilizing the
alternate provider is meaningful.27
Who is the mythical "alternative provider" with whom
providers must compare their risk factors? Is it the best pro-
vider available? The "average provider"? The next best pro-
vider? There is no clearly correct answer. We would ask provid-
ers to compare their risk factors with those of marginal
substitutes that are readily available under similar economic
conditions in the same market. These substitutes need not be
superior providers, or even average ones. So long as a substitute
who is substantially less risky is easily available to the patient, a
provider ought to pause before deciding to perform the proce-
dure herself.
If a provider with a high adjusted risk factor per-
forms a procedure that a reasonable provider in that position
would not perform, knowing the risk factor and the distribution
of risk factors of other providers, it is fair to conclude that per-
forming the procedure is negligent. This is so whether one uses
an efficiency concept of negligence2 ' or a community standards
dence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 385 (1985).
17 It is important to distinguish the magnitude of the difference from its statistical
significance. Statistical significance provides us with confidence that the observed differ-
ence is not the result of random fluctuations in the data. Yet the difference in perform-
ance level from one doctor to another may not be great. Even if one is quite sure that a
small difference exists, the difference in the performance level may be too minute to
justify the conclusion that the doctor's decision to perform the surgery was negligent.
28 The leading tort decision expressing the efficiency concept is United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). In that case Judge Learned Hand took
the position that whether an actor's injury-causing conduct was negligent depended on
three variables: (1) the probability that injury would result from the actor's conduct; (2)
the gravity of the harm that could be expected to result should injury occur; and (3) the
burden of taking precautions that would have avoided or minimized the injury. Hand
suggested that the test could be reduced to algebraic terms: "[I]f the probability be
called P; the injury L [loss]; and the burden B [i.e., the burden of precaution to have
avoided the loss]; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B< PL." Id. at 173.
A quarter of a century passed before Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner pointed
out that the Hand negligence tort formula was in lock-step with an economic test of
negligence. In a landmark article expressing the "law and economics" perspective on the
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concept. 29 It is certainly inefficient for a provider to perform a
procedure with a lower net expected benefit than another pro-
vider who, even after taking into account the transaction costs of
identifying the substitute provider, yields a higher net expected
benefit. Similarly, a provider who performs procedures that con-
sistently have significantly worse outcomes than those of an al-
ternate provider, for whatever reason, can easily be said to be
performing below the community standard.
Two points must be clearly understood. First, we do not
suggest that the providers at the bottom of a "success rate" list
are per se negligent in deciding to perform their procedures.
Such a suggestion would be logically and practically incoherent.
Every rank order list has a bottom. If the legal system impels a
provider at the bottom of the list to refrain from performing a
procedure, the next lowest provider will now be at the bottom
and similarly be impelled to abstain from performing the spe-
cific procedure. This vicious cycle would result in driving all
providers but the single best from each field. Rather, it must be
subject, Posner argued that the Hand formula stood for the following proposition:
Discounting (multiplying) the cost of an accident if it occurs by the probability
of occurrence yields a measure of the economic benefit to be anticipated from
incurring the costs necessary to prevent the accident. The cost of prevention is
what Hand meant by the burden of taking precautions against the accident. It
may be the cost of installing safety equipment or otherwise making the activity
safer, or the benefit foregone by curtailing or eliminating the activity. If the
cost of safety measures or of curtailment-whichever cost is lower-exceeds the
benefit in accident avoidance to be gained by incurring that cost, society would
be better off, in economic terms, to forgo accident prevention. A rule making
the enterprise liable for the accidents that occur in such cases cannot be justi-
fied on the ground that it will induce the enterprise to increase the safety of its
operations. When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a
rational profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident
victims rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore,
overall economic value or welfare would be diminished rather than increased
by incurring a higher accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower acci-
dent cost. If, on the other hand, the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the
costs of prevention, society is better off if those costs are incurred and the
accident averted, and so in this case the enterprise is made liable, in the expec-
tation that self-interest will lead it to adopt the precautions in order to avoid a
greater cost in tort judgments.
Richard A. Posner, Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972).
29 Generally, medical custom sets the standard of care in traditional malpractice liti-
gation. See Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 549 (1959); Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases,
51 IND. L.J. 528 (1976).
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emphasized that a provider at the bottom of the list who contin-
ues to perform the procedure in question is negligent only if the
gap between that provider's risk factor and that of the alterna-
tive provider is such that a reasonable provider would refrain.
Most often, this will not be the case. The difference between
that provider's risk factor and that of an alternate provider may
not be significant,30 or, if significant, it may not be substantial.3 1
Second, if a provider's risk factor is substantially higher
than that of an alternative provider, and the difference is statis-
tically significant, it is negligent for the provider to perform the
procedure even if it cannot be said that the provider generally
performs the procedure "poorly." It is negligent to expose the
patient to higher risks than necessary.
For example, imagine an ambulance dispatcher who has two
ambulances at his disposal. The first ambulance is a well-main-
tained 1988 model with equipment that was state-of-the-art at
the time of manufacture. The second ambulance is a 1992 model
equipped with sophisticated new devices to revive patients in
cardiac arrest; these new devices, which substantially increase
the probability of a patient's survival, were not available in 1988.
If the dispatcher receives a call reporting a patient in cardiac
arrest, which ambulance should be sent? There is no doubt that,
if both ambulances are available, the 1992 model ought to be
dispatched. Why? Because the patient will have a higher
probability of survival. This conclusion does not depend on any
pejorative judgment as to the quality of the well-maintained
1988 model; in other contexts it is a fine machine. But it would
be the wrong machine to send on this mission. The analogy to
choosing between medical providers could not be closer.
If a provider negligently decides to perform a particular
procedure, and the procedure results in injury to the patient,
does the negligent act of the provider have enough of a causal
link to the patient's injury to justify liability? At first blush, it
would appear that there is a "but-for" causal connection be-
tween the decision and the injury. After all, if the provider had
not performed the ill-considered procedure, the injury in ques-
tion would not have resulted.
Further reflection reveals that the causation issue is more
30 See supra note 26.
11 See supra text accompanying note 27.
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complicated. The likely outcome of the procedure had it been
performed by an alternate provider must be considered. It is
possible that an adverse outcome might have occurred even if
the procedure had been performed by a provider with a lower
risk factor. Should this possibility affect the existence of liability
or the measure of damages? The answer to this question triggers
difficult analytical issues of both fact and law. In determining
what would have happened to the patient if another provider
had performed the procedure, the fact finder's task is not the
typical fact reconstruction task of determining what actually
happened-the other provider did not perform the procedure.
Rather, the fact finder must determine what would have hap-
pened if an alternate provider had performed the procedure.32
Moreover, the fact finder's determination will certainly be a
probabilistic statement rather than a simple yes or no answer.33
How should the legal system compare the injury that did
occur following the negligent act of performing the procedure
with the injury that might or might not have occurred if an al-
ternate provider had performed the procedure? On closer analy-
sis, the answer to this probabilistic causation question depends
on the relative risks associated with the two providers. To see
' The literature discussing the cause-in-fact requirement is voluminous. See, e.g.,
HERBERT L. A. HART AND ToNY HoNoRE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); AINo C.
BECHT & FRANK NV. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT
LIABILITY CASES (1961); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L Rv.
60 (1956); Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 iicH. L. ,Ev.
543 (1962).
A provider might legitimately argue in defense that despite the fact that she sub-
jected a patient to greater than necessary risk by undertaking the procedure in question,
the identical result would have taken place even had an alternate, less risky provider
performed the procedure. While such proof is likely to be difficult to come by, we would
clearly allow the defense to break the causal chain. See infra text accompanying notes
39-40.
'4An extensive body of literature has developed dealing with the issue of probabilis-
tic causation. See, e.g., Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984); Christopher L. Callahan, Establishment
of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 ARIz ST. LJ. 605 (1991); Richard Delgado,
Beyond SindeL" Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CA-
LIF. L. REv. 881 (1982); Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemialogical
Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-In-Fact, 7 HARV. ENv. L. REv. 429 (1983); Nancy Lee
Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-In-Fact: Alternative Forms of
Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TkuP. L. R v. 311
(1990); Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persua-
sion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986); Leonard 1. Jaffee, Of Probativ-
ity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at Trial,
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how the relative risks affect the analysis, imagine two rather ex-
treme situations.
EXAMPLE 1-Assume first that the provider in question had
a 10% risk of adverse outcome from a particular procedure,
while the risk associated with an alternate provider was zero;
that is, an alternate provider would never have an adverse out-
come from the procedure. Assume further that, based on this
risk information, it was negligent for the provider in question to
perform the procedure. This case is quite simple. Each time the
provider in question performs the procedure with an adverse
outcome, it can be said with certainty that the adverse outcome
resulted from the negligent decision of the provider to perform
the procedure. Therefore, the provider should be liable for the
full damages associated with the adverse outcome.
EXAMPLE 2-At the other extreme, assume that for a partic-
ular procedure utilized only for gravely ill patients, the provider
in question has a 70% risk of adverse outcome, while the risk
associated with an alternate provider is 55%. Assume further
that, based on this risk information, it was negligent for the pro-
vider in question to perform the procedure. Although the pro-
vider is negligent, one cannot say that the negligence certainly
caused the adverse outcome. Of course, the legal system does not
demand certainty. In a civil lawsuit, all that is typically required
is that the plaintif demonstrate his case by a preponderance of
the. evidence. Probablistically, this translates into a requirement
that the plaintiff demonstrate that it is more likely than not that
the facts supporting liability are present-i.e., the plaintiff must
show that the probability is greater than 0.5. 35 In this hypotheti-
cal situation, since the doctor's negligence caused only a slight
increase in the likelihood of an adverse outcome, it cannot be
said that the provider, more likely than not, brought about the
46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 925 (1985); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation and Chance in
Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90
YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Saul Levmore, Probablistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recur-
ring Wrongs, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 691 (1"990); Glen 0. Robinson, Probablistic Causation and
Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 779 (1985); David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System,
97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk,
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the
Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001 (1988); Laura L. Gonsakves, Note, Probability of Causa-
tion in Radiation Tort Litigation, 24 TULSA L.J. 479 (1989).
" See generally Cohen, supra note 26.
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adverse results. Rather, it is more likely than not that the pa-
tient would have suffered the same adverse result even if an al-
ternate provider had performed the procedure.
Should the negligent provider prevail because of the pa-
tient's inability to state with high enough probabilistic certainty
that the negligence brought about the adverse result? Certainly
a rule that the negligent provider should always prevail in a case
like Example 2 will result in fewer fact finding errors than a rule
that the negligent provider always loses. After all, the risk fac-
tors suggest that for every 70 adverse outcomes that would re-
sult from procedures performed by the provider in question, 55
would have occurred anyway if the procedure were performed by
the typical provider. Yet to hold the negligent providers not lia-
ble is to immunize them for the effects of their negligence. For
every 100 procedures performed by a typical provider, the risk
factors suggest that there would be 45 favorable outcomes and
55 adverse outcomes. For every 100 procedures performed by the
provider in question, however, the risk factors suggest that there
would be 15 additional cases with an adverse outcome and, cor-
respondingly, 15 fewer cases with favorable outcomes.
How should the legal system account for the 15 additional
adverse results flowing from the provider's negligent decision to
perform the procedure even though, in any particular case, it is
less likely than not that adverse results resulted from that deci-
sion? The legal system does not deal well with questions of this
sort, and there is no obvious solution that comports with notions
of accuracy and individual justice. We would, with some reluc-
tance, follow the lead of the concurring opinion in Herskovitz v.
Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sounds awarding the pa-
tient a partial recovery based on the decreased chance of a suc-
cessful procedure brought about by the provider's negligence.
The trend toward proportional recovery in "lost chance" cases
has generated considerable momentum and provides a real op-
tion for resolving intractable causation cases when traditional
standards cannot be met and may be inapposite 7
-6 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson J., concurring).
In Herskovitz plaintiff-decedent contended that the failure of a physician to
timely diagnose lung cancer reduced his chance of recovery from 39% (Stage 1 tumor) to
25% (Stage 2 tumor). The concurring opinion by Judge Pearson, relying on Joseph H.
King, Causation, Valuation and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting
Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YAE LEJ. 1353 (1981), suggested that plaintiff
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The proportional recovery would work as follows: of every
100 patients treated by the provider in qi.estion, 70 would have
an adverse outcome. Fifty-five of those 70 would have suffered
the adverse outcome even if the procedure had been performed
by the alternate provider, while 15 of the adverse outcomes can
be said to have resulted from the increased risk associated with
the provider in question. Thus, if all 70 unfortunate patients
sued the provider, the provider's total liability should be for 15
adverse outcomes. Accordingly, each patient should receive a re-
covery that represents 15/70 of his total injury. 8
be granted the proportion of his damages recovery reflecting the percentage of lost
chance created by the physician's negligence. Accord Broody v. United States, 706 F.
Supp. 1548, 1564-67 (D. Kan. 1989); Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1482 n.1
(D. Colo. 1985); DeBurharte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 139 (Iowa 1986); Falcon v. Me-
morial Hospital, 462 N.W.2d 44, 56-57 (Mich. 1990); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P,2d
824 (Mont. 1985) (citing with approval the doctrine of proportional causation, but not
clearly adopting proportional recovery); Perez v. Las Vegas Medical Center, 805 P.2d
589, 592 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 406-07 (N.J. 1990); McKellips v.
Saint Francis Hospital, 741 P.2d 467, 476 (Okla. 1987).
For a discussion of the authors' views as to how lost chance percentages should be
calculated, see infra text accompanying note 38. Other courts totally reject recovery for
"lost chance." See, e.g., Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc. 445 So.2d 1015,
1020-21 (Fla. 1984); Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hospital, 580 A.2d 206, 211 (Md.
1990); Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So.2d 439, 445 (Miss. 1985); Pillsbury-Flood v. Ports-
mouth Hospital, 512 A.2d 1126, 1129 (N.H. 1986); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincin-
nati, 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971).
However, a significant number of courts recognize recovery for "lost chance" even
when the likelihood that death or injury would have been avoided is under 50%. For the
most part, it appears that once the "lost chance" is established, the courts leave the issue
of recovery to jury discretion without instruction that damages are to be reduced by
some fixed proportion. See e.g., Jones v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 587-88 (N.D.
Cal. 1980); Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, Inc., 688 P.2d 605-16 (Ariz.
1984); Sharp v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Colorado, 710 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Colo.
App. 1985); Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 431 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. 1981); Brown v. Kou-
lizahis, 331 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Va. 1985); Thornton v. CAMC, Etc., 305 S.E.2d 316, 323-24
(W.Va. 1983); Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 763 (Wis. 1990).
" The courts that have granted proportional recovery have opted for a slightly dif-
ferent and, we believe, inaccurate formula. Consider, for example, the following discus-
sion in McKellips, 741 P.2d at 477:
To illustrate the method in a case where the jury determines from the statisti-
cal findings combined with the specific facts relevant to the patient the patient
originally had a 40% chance of cure and the physician's negligence reduced the
chance of cure to 25%, (40%-25%) 15% represents the patient's loss of sur-
vival. If the total amount of damages proved by the evidence is $500,000, the
damages caused by defendant is 15% x $500,000 or $75,000.
Id. at 477. Under the formula suggested in McKellips though, for every 100 patients
treated by the negligent physician, 75 would have had adverse outcomes. Sixty patients
would have died even if an alternate provider had performed the procedure; 15 extra
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What about cases between the extremes? Consider the fol-
lowing two cases:
Example 3-Assume that for a particular procedure the pro-
vider in question has a 15% risk of adverse outcome, while the
risk associated with an alternate provider is 10%. Assume fur-
ther that, based on this risk information, it was negligent for the
provider in question to perform the procedure. Finally, assume
that performance of the procedure results in an adverse outcome
for the patient. Is the provider in question liable for the dam-
ages associated with the adverse outcome?
At first glance, this case may seem easily distinguishable
from Example 2. The provider in question negligently proceeded
with the procedure and the adverse outcome resulted. Had an
alternate provider performed the procedure, on the other hand,
there would have been a 90% chance that the adverse outcome
would not have occurred. It would seem, then, that it is more
likely than not that the adverse outcome can be blamed on the
risky provider's negligent decision.
Upon closer analysis, however, the negligence of the pro-
vider in question only raised the probability of suffering an ad-
verse outcome from 10% to 15%. Therefore, of the 15 adverse
outcomes that could be expected from every 100 procedures per-
formed by the negligent provider, 10 could have been expected
to result even with a non-negligent provider. Thus, the chances
are only 13 that the adverse outcome resulted from the negligent
decision to proceed.
How should the legal system respond? Once again, the au-
thors would adopt an approach that would allow for propor-
tional recovery.
Example 4-Assume that for a particular procedure the
provider in question has a 15% risk of adverse outcome, while
the risk associated with an alternate provider is 5%. Assume
further that, based on this risk information, it was negligent for
the provider in question to perform the procedure. Finally, as-
sume that performance of the procedure results in an adverse
outcome for the patient. Should the provider in question be lia-
ble for the damages associated with the adverse outcome?
deaths are, therefore, attributable to the negligent physician. In our view, the patient is
thus entitled to 15/75 or 20% of full damages rather than the 15% suggested by the
McKellips court.
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While superficially similar to Example 3, this example is ac-
tually quite different. In Example 3, only a minority of the ad-
verse outcomes expected from procedures performed by the pro-
vider in question would result from the increased risk associated
with that provider. In Example 4, on the other hand, of the 15
adverse outcomes that can be expected from every 100 proce-
dures performed by the provider in question, only 5 would be
expected from an alternate provider. In other words, two out of
every three adverse outcomes occurring with the provider in
question result from the increased risk associated with that pro-
vider. Thus, it is more likely than not that the adverse outcome
in this particular case resulted from the decision of the provider
in question to perform the procedure.
Does this mean that the provider is liable whenever an ad-
verse outcome results from a provider's negligent decision to
perform a procedure in a case such as Example 4? The tempta-
tion is to say yes. After all, in each case, it is more likely than
not that the negligent decision "caused" the outcome and there-
fore, under the proof standard traditionally applicable in civil
cases, the plaintiff would be entitled to full recovery. Yet if re-
covery is granted in all such cases, there will be, in the aggre-
gate, overcompensation to patients and overpayment by provid-
ers. If the provider in Example 4 performed 100 such
procedures, 15 adverse outcomes would be expected. For each of
these 15 cases, it was more likely than not that the provider's
negligence caused the adverse outcome. Yet in only 10 of the 15
cases did the provider's negligence actually cause the adverse
outcome. If full recovery is given in all 15 cases, there will be
overcompensation and overpayment to the extent of 5 extra
payments.
Of course, we cannot determine which are the five extra
cases. What can be done to avoid overcompensation? We would
award damages to each patient who suffers an adverse outcome
under these circumstances, but reduce the amount of the recov-
ery to account for the proportion of "extra" cases in which the
adverse outcome would have occurred if an alternate provider
had performed the procedure. Thus, applying the proportional
recovery rule to this example, the patient's recovery would be
reduced by 1/3 to account for the 5 out of every 15 patients who
would have suffered the adverse outcome if an alternate pro-
vider had performed the procedure. By giving each patient who
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suffers an adverse outcome such a proportionate recovery, the
aggregate compensation will be accurate. The disadvantage of
this approach, of course, is that while aggregate compensation
will always be accurate, individual compensation will never be
accurate. Ten of the 15 patients will be undercompensated and 5
will be overcompensated.
One final question must be addressed. The preceding analy-
sis has dealt with recovery for a negligent decision to perform a
procedure. Is there any role for evidence as to whether the pro-
cedure in question was itself performed negligently in a lawsuit
based on the negligent decision to perform the procedure?
In cases in which the decision to perform the procedure is
negligent, evidence that the procedure was also performed negli-
gently does not augment the case that the provider should be
liable for her improper decision. The improper decision to per-
form the procedure is sufficient for liability to attach. However,
evidence of negligent performance may provide the predicate for
a classical malpractice action.39
What about evidence that the procedure was not performed
negligently? Can the provider introduce this evidence in a case
39 It could be argued that the possible overlap of classical (negligent performance)
malpractice and a cause of action for a negligent decision to perform a procedure could
result in excess liability for providers. The theory would be that an important ingredient
of a provider's high risk factor might be a frequency of cases in which the provider per-
forms the procedure negligently. If, under traditional malpractice law, those who could
prove that they were victims of the negligent performance recovered 100% of their harm,
while, under the cause of action set forth in this article, those who had similar adverse
outcomes, but could not prove negligent performance, got a proportionate recovery, the
total of all recoveries would exceed the total harm. This excess liability problem is theo-
retically present. However, given the small percentage of malpractice victims who bring
claims against their providers, is very unlikely to ever result in actual overpayment by
defendants. See REPORT By THE HARvARD M, IcAL PRACTIcE STUDY To mn STAT OF
NEW YORK, PATIENTS, DocroRs, AD LAWYEs. MEDICAL INJURY. MAlPRAcncE LrGATio.N.
AND PATIENT COmENSATION iN NEW YORK (1990).
It is interesting that this problem of overdeterrence is inescapable whenever the law
permits recovery on a statistical basis, but also simultaneously permits traditional indi-
vidual litigation. For example, most courts that allow market-share liability in products
liability litigation, see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980), also permit an individual defendant to prove itself out of
the case by establishing that its product was not the cause of the plainti's harm. A
defendant who proves itself out of the case shifts its percentage of the harm to other
defendants who are not able to prove that their products were not responsible for the
harm. For a more extensive discussion of this phenomenon, see Aaron D. Twerski, The
Problem of Indeterminate Defendants: Market Share and Non-Market Share Liabil-
ity-A Tale of Two Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. Ray. 869, 872-73 (1989).
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based on the provider's negligent decision to perform the proce-
dure? The answer here is quite subtle. The action against the
provider for a negligent decision to perform does not depend on
the performance itself being negligent-it was negligent to ex-
pose the patient to the higher risk associated with even compe-
tent performance of the procedure by this provider. However, if
the provider can demonstrate that this patient would have suf-
fered the adverse outcome even if an alternate provider had per-
formed the procedure, the causal link between the negligent de-
cision and the outcome is broken and the patient should not
recover. In most circumstances, though, it is highly unlikely that
the provider can make this showing.
40
2. Informed Consent
We begin our analysis of the informed consent doctrine as it
relates to provider-specific information by first outlining the
traditional cause of action where the information concerns risks
associated with the procedure. What must plaintiffs prove when
they claim that a doctor failed to disclose the risk of, or the al-
ternatives to, a recommended treatment? Courts universally
agree that a doctor has a duty to inform a patient about material
risks of a therapeutic intervention.4' Considerable controversy
exists as to how materiality is to be measured. In the early years
of informed consent litigation, courts took the position that the
standard for medical disclosure was that information which a
"reasonable doctor" would provide under the circumstances.42
0 The analogy to res ipsa loquitur is quite compelling. Once a plaintiff has estab-
lished a credible res ipsa case it is difficult for the defendant to rebut it by merely pro-
ducing evidence of "reasonable conduct" on his part. As one commentator noted, it
raises a gnawing question: if the defendant's conduct was so good, why did the injury
occur? See Fleming James, Jr., Proof of Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa
Loquitor), 37 VA. L. REV. 179, 227 (1951); see also Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379
F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Goldstein v. Levy, 132
N.Y.S. 373 (N.Y. App. Term. 1911). At most, such rebuttal evidence of non-negligence
goes to the jury together with the res ipsa inference. Ultimately, the only effective way to
rebut a res ipsa case is to point to an alternative cause that explains why the injury
happened. A provider who is found to be negligent for having undertaken to perform a
procedure will have difficulty defending his case unless he can establish another
cause-other than his presumed negligence-that would have caused the injury even if
the procedure were performed by an alternate provider.
41 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 2, § 32 at 189-192; FOWLER v. HARPER ET AL.,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 17.1 at 558-67 (2d ed. 1989).
" Beginning with Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960), courts articulated
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This test was identical to the standard that governed negligent
medical treatment. Expert medical testimony regarding what a
prudent doctor would tell similarly situated patients was almost
invariably required. Two decades ago several leading courts took
issue with this medical standard, finding it an inadequate mea-
sure of the amount of information that a patient should be enti-
tled to receive before choosing a therapeutic intervention. 3 To
foster greater patient autonomy, these courts defined a risk as
material if a reasonable person in the patient's position would
wish to know of the risk or the therapeutic alternative prior to
making a decision. Because the standard wasno longer based on
medical expertise, a plaintiff was not obliged to produce expert
testimony to establish what information should have been trans-
mitted. Juries were entitled to conclude from a description of
the options whether a "reasonable person" would have desired
the information in question.
If a patient successfully establishes breach of the duty to
inform, yet another set of obstacles must be overcome. First, the
plaintiff must establish that the medical procedure chosen by
the physician was responsible for the plaintiffs injuries (injury
causation)." For the most part this aspect of causation is rather
easily established. Almost always the risk not warned against
materialized. Had a different intervention or no intervention
been chosen, that risk would not have resulted. Admittedly,
problems arise because of the possibility (often the likelihood)
that had another course of action been chosen other risks would
have materialized in injury."5 But the direct cause of the harm
that the plaintiff actually did suffer is not often in question. The
the standard for medical disclosure as that information which a reasonable medical doc-
tor would provide under the circumstances. See, e.g., Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1076
(6th Cir. 1981); Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 86 (Ariz. 1965), modified, 411 P.2d 45
(Ariz. 1966); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Ark. 1980); Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181
So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 1965); see also, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General
Measure of Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88
A.LR 3D 1008 (1978).
43 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cr.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676
(R.L 1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852 (Wash. 1974), afJ'd per curiam, 530 P.2d
334 (Wash. 1975).
44 See Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment:
An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. Prrr. L, Rsv. 407, 438-39 (1980).
4 See Epstein, supra note 17, at 121-25; Schultz, supra note 2, at 283.91.
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procedure chosen by the physician to treat the patient will al-
most always be responsible for the adverse result.
A second obstacle to recovery involves the requirement that
a patient must convince the court that, had the information
withheld been given, the patient would have chosen a different
course of action-one that would have avoided the injury (deci-
sion-causation). Once again courts differ in how properly to ar-
ticulate the test for determining this aspect of causation. Most
ask whether a reasonable person would have decided to forgo
the injury-causing therapy had the information been given.46 A
few courts focus directly on the particular plaintiff-would this
patient have decided otherwise.47 Under either test the plain-
tiff's burden is significant.
In an informed consent case the contention is not that the
doctor's medical advice in recommending a given procedure was
deficient, but rather that the patient's consent would have been
withheld if more information had been provided. As noted ear-
lier, it is often difficult to convince a jury that a patient would
have rejected sound medical advice to cure or alleviate an imme-
diate problem had he known the risk, or that a patient would
have chosen another therapeutic procedure against the advice of
his treating physician who believed that the recommended ther-
apy was best for the patient."
While the fundamental structure of the traditional informed
consent case and a case based on the failure to inform patients
of the special risks that arise due to the identity of the provider
remain the same, provider-specific informed consent raises a
host of issues that have never been addressed.
First and foremost, does a provider have a duty to disclose
information that identifies the provider as an independent risk
factor? The answer, we believe, is yes. This information relates
'0 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91; Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11-12; Reikes v. Martin, 471
So.2d 385, 392-93 (Miss. 1985). A large majority of courts that adopted the Canterbury
test, which judges materiality by a lay rather than a medical standard, follow this view
on causation. See 3 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 2, App. L., at 193, 206-
45.
" Following Canterbury, only a small minority of jurisdictions test causation by a
subjective standard (i.e., what would this particular patient have decided if provided
with the requisite information?). Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Okla. 1979);
Arina v. Gingrich, 733 P.2d 75, 79 (Or. 1987); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (R.I.
1972).
"' See supra note 15.
[Vol. 58: 5
COMPARING MEDICAL PROVIDERS
directly to the results likely to flow from a decision to have this
provider perform this procedure. It is not difficult to conclude
that a reasonable doctor should provide this potentially outcome
determinative information to the patient and that a reasonable
patient would want this information as part of the decision-
making process.
This type of potentially outcome determinative information
can be distinguished from other provider-specific information.
One of the authors regularly asked his class over the years
whether an obstetrician is required to tell her patients that she
received a grade of C- on her examination in obstetrics. What if
she took examinations for board certification and failed them
the first two times and barely passed the last time? Might not a
"reasonable patient" want to know that information before plac-
ing herself in the hands of the surgeon? That a patient might
wish to have this information does not resolve the duty question.
A patient might wish to know many things about the back-
ground of a surgeon before going under the knife. Did the sur-
geon sleep poorly the night before surgery due to a domestic dis-
pute with a spouse? Before coming to surgery, did the provider's
stockbroker call, insisting that a margin call be met?
Ultimately the decision of what information is material for
the purpose of informed consent is a question of law for the
courts. Courts will likely conclude that this sort of general back-
ground information and much idiosyncratic data about a physi-
cian need not be revealed because as a matter of public policy it
is not sufficiently focused, relating only tangentially to physician
performance. Any link to likely results in a particular case is
highly speculative. Moreover, if this genre of information were
introduced at trial, there would be legitimate concern that the
prejudicial impact would outweigh its probative value.4
There is no litmus test to help discern which items need be
revealed and which may be concealed. However, provider-spe-
cific data geared to a clearly delineated surgical procedure will
pass a threshold duty test. If information is available that iden-
tifies a particular provider as an independent risk factor, courts
will treat this information just as they treat other risk informa-
tion that must be passed on to patients for their consideration.
49 JOaN W. STRONG. MCCORLMCK ON EvMEcE § 185 (4th ed. 1992).
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Having decided that provider-specific risk information is
subject to the same disclosure principles as other risk informa-
tion, the next issue to determine is under what circumstances
such information must be disclosed. To establish a claim, a pa-
tient must prove that a medical provider failed to inform him of
material risks. In this context, as was the case with the pro-
vider's negligent decision to perform the procedure, materiality
encompasses two separate considerations. First, a determination
must be made that a difference exists between the performance
of one provider and another.50 Second, the magnitude of the dif-
ference must be such that disclosure is warranted.51
These two factors-the significance of the difference in rela-
tive risks between the provider in question and an alternate pro-
vider, and the magnitude of that difference-are the same fac-
tors identified in the discussion concerning a provider's
negligent decision to perform a procedure. 2 However, the fac-
tors would be applied somewhat differently here. First, we would
not require as large a difference in risks in the duty to disclose
context as in the negligent decision to perform context. Imagine
a provider whose performance of a particular procedure is riskier
than the performance of a typical provider, but not so much so
that it is negligent for the provider to perform the procedure at
all. The increased level of risk may be substantial enough, none-
theless, that a reasonable doctor would disclose it to her patient
and a reasonable patient would want to know about it in making
his decision.
Second, a less stringent significance test would be employed
to determine whether the difference in risk factors between the
provider in question and the alternate provider is signifi-
cant-such as whether the difference in risk factors reflects a
true difference in likely outcomes or is merely an illusion result-
ing from random factors in the data. Similarly, in determining
whether the magnitude of the difference between the provider's
risk factor and that of the alternate provider exceeds the thresh-
old described in the previous paragraph, a less stringent signifi-
cance test would also be used. The less stringent the test, the
easier it will be for the patient to demonstrate significance. In
50 See supra note 25.
'1 See supra text accompanying note 26.
52 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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choosing a less stringent significance test in the informed choice
context, the authors are guided by the observation that relative
costs of erroneous determinations in the informed choice context
are different than in the negligence context. The cost to the pro-
vider of an incorrect determination that she should disclose rela-
tive risk information about a procedure is much less than the
cost to a provider of an incorrect determination that she should
refrain from performing the procedure at all.23
Assuming that a patient can establish that the provider
should have disclosed the provider-specific information, he must
still successfully establish a causal relationship between the
failed communication and the injury suffered. Strangely enough,
the causation issue will remain a formidable obstacle for plaintiff
recovery, albeit for reasons that are very much different than are
present in a traditional informed consent case. Earlier it was
noted that two causation questions must be addressed-injury-
causation and decision-causation. In the run-of-the-mill in-
formed consent case, decision-causation is quite difficult to
demonstrate while injury-causation is relatively simple to prove.
With regard to provider-specific informed consent, the reverse is
likely to be true.
Establishing the decision-causation linkage that is so prob-
lematic in the traditional informed consent case is much more
plausible in provider-specific cases. In the traditional informed
consent case it is often difficult to convince a jury that a patient
faced with a serious illness and having received a proposed treat-
ment plan would have rejected treatment had the doctor in-
formed the patient of risks attendant to the procedure, or the
possibility of undergoing an alternative procedure with its own
set of risks. Since, by hypothesis in an informed consent case,
the doctor's advice is non-negligent, a jury is likely to conclude
that a patient's ex post remonstrations would never have been
53 Significance tests-whether they require significance at the 0.01 level (99% confi-
dence level), 0.05 level (95% confidence level) or 0.10 level (90% confidence
level)-reflect a choice about how to balance the cost of errors resulting from incorrect
determinations as to whether the truth of an hypothesis has been demonstrated. See
Cohen, supra note 26. By choosing a less stringent test in the informed choice context
than in the negligence context, we reflect our belief that the ratio betveen the cost of
incorrectly determining that there is a substantial difference in risk between the provider
in question and an alternate provider, and incorrectly determining that there is no sub-
stantial difference, is higher in the negligence context than in the informed choice con-
text. Id.
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made ex ante even had the information been made available."
With regard to provider-specific information, however, it is very
likely that a jury will find a patient's statement credible that,
had he known that a physician with a better success rate was
available, the patient would not have agreed to undergo surgery
at the hands of a less skilled surgeon. This assertion has a com-
mon sense ring of truth.
In traditional informed consent cases, a patient rarely has
difficulty in establishing that the injury was caused as a result of
the physician's unauthorized medical intervention. The patient
almost always predicates the case on the doctor's failure to in-
form him of a specific risk or an alternative treatment that
would have avoided the risk that eventuated. Thus the answer
to the "but-for" question-had the doctor properly informed the
patient and had the patient chosen against the therapeutic in-
tervention would the injury have been avoided-is almost cer-
tainly affirmative.
In provider-specific informed choice claims, on the other
hand, the injury causation question will be far more trouble-
some. Had the patient chosen a different physician, or a differ-
ent hospital, to perform the surgery, it is still possible that the
same injury would have resulted. Even an alternate provider
would have some adverse outcomes. If a court is required to re-
solve this question using traditional causation norms, injury-cau-
sation will be difficult to establish and the same type of over and
under compensation problem discussed earlier will surface.", Ac-
cordingly, courts should draw on proportional causation princi-
ples to resolve the causation dilemma. 56 However, unlike cases
involving the negligent decision to perform the medical proce-
dure, the differential between one provider and an alternate
(once this type of negligence is removed from the picture) is not
likely to result in a significant proportional recovery.
At this point, the question of whether in a world of perfect
information all patients would have access to the very best sur-
geons is put aside. The authors suspect that ranking is likely to
lead to a very significant rush to the top of the list, thus relegat-
ing many patients to other than the "super stars." This would,
See supra notes 25-26.
66 See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 32-39.
56 Id.
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of course, complicate the materiality and injury-causation ques-
tions even further. If most patients would have no access to
other than second-tier surgeons, for example, the skill differen-
tial between the surgeon actually chosen and the available sur-
geon may turn out to be either statistically insignificant, or so
small that injury causation cannot be established in any credible
way.
3. The Real World: Where Negligence and Informed Con-
sent Meet
The foregoing discussion posited a world where negligent
performance of a procedure and informed consent are very sepa-
rate and easily distinguishable causes of action. In the real world
of litigation, lawyers know that not to be true. Plaintiffs consider
them as complementary causes of action with each strengthening
the other. Thus, whether the informed choice case is strong
enough to stand alone is often of little relevance. If a patient can
portray the physician as less than forthright or downright
unknowledgeable about the treatment alternatives, it helps bol-
ster the claim that the medical intervention actually chosen was
not the proper one for this particular patient. As long as the
patient has presented a plausible case on informed consent or
negligent decision to perform a procedure, whether the patient
wins or loses on informed consent alone may make little differ-
ence. Even if the plaintiff should lose the informed consent
claim, the jury will have been privy to the evidence. The value of
limiting instructions in wiping away the impressions left by the
damaging testimony is questionable.
In this context, litigation involving provider-specific risk in-
formation may have major significance. Of course, this raises a
question of whether courts should refuse to try provider-specific
informed choice or negligent decision to perform a procedure
cases in conjunction with the traditional malpractice claims be-
cause one will so heavily prejudice the other. Although the spill-
over effect is present today when both informed consent and
medical malpractice are tried together, the taint would probably
become more serious when a physician charged with malpractice
was portrayed as one whose relative risk factor places her below
the average.
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CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to provide a sneak preview of the
fascinating issues that will surface when litigators attempt to use
provider-specific statistics in the context of tort litigation
against hospitals and doctors. Many may argue that the perva-
sive use of such statistical data in the legal arena is against pub-
lic policy, contending that: many physicians will refuse to take
on high-risk patients for fear that their statistics will be nega-
tively effected; intern and resident programs will be hampered
by statistics which show that beginners do not perform as well
as seasoned veterans; medical consumers are incapable of under-
standing the fine points of statistical significance and will mis-
understand and thus misuse the information that is revealed to
them; and an already overburdened court system cannot handle
such difficult statistical problems and integrate them into highly
individualistic malpractice litigation. While these arguments
have merit, they will ultimately fail. As the quantity and quality
of provider-specific statistics increase, the pressure for the legal
system to integrate them into litigation will become inexorable.
Provider specific statistics will likely be used for peer review, in-
surance rate-setting and physician selection by patients. It is un-
likely that these statistics will be excluded from the tort litiga-
tion system.
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